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JURISDICTION
Plaintiff

concurs

in the

jurisdiction

statement

of the

Defendant.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff

concurs

in the Defendant's description of the

nature of the proceedings.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Plaintiff concurs in the statement of issues presented by
the Defendant for appeal.

In doing so the Plaintiff suggests to

the Court of Appeals that there are insufficient facts on which
to base these legal issues raised on appeal.
1

2

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

Plaintiff concurs in the citation of determinative statutes.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

a.

Nature of the Case:

Plaintiff concurs in Defendant's

description of the nature of the case.
b.

Course of Proceedings:

Plaintiff concurs in Defendant's

description of the course of proceedings.
c.

Disposition

at Trial Court:

Plaintiff

concurs in

Defendant's description of the disposition at trial court.
d.

Relevant Facts:

Plaintiff in significant part disagrees

that the facts presented by the Defendant's brief are adequate to
explain the trial court's ruling in this case.
The Defendant purchased
standard

vehicle

Defendant

financing

testified

that

the vehicle and entered
arrangement

she moved

with

from

into a

Chrysler Credit.

Tremonton, Utah to

various locations in New Mexico.

TR at 61-62.

one month in Gallop.

Then she moved to Tofagai and

TD at 62.

lived there three months. Id.
Id.

First she lived

Finally she moved back to Gallop.

She testified that she was living there at the date of

trial.

Id.

Evidently, she maintained a post office box in a

town eight miles west of Gallop called Mittmore.

Id at 42.

However, at some time she let her brother-in-law, Ernest

3

Hawthorne, have the car.

Id at 43.

She testified he was

supposed to make the payments and she gave the car to him.
43-44.

She testified that her last payment was in September or

October of 1986.
in

Id at

Brimhall,

Id at 43.

New

Mexico

Defendant resided.

Evidently the brother-in-law lived

about

an

hour's

drive

from

where

Id at 45-46.

She testified that at a later date her brother-in-law told
her the car was picked up for non-payment. TR at 52.

She

testified that she didn't have any money so she didn't make any
contact or take any action.
the

truck

was

on

the

Id at 53. There is no evidence that
reservation

when

Chrysler

Credit

repossessed.
It is clear
repossession

that the Plaintiff was not present at the

and

had

repossession occurred.

no

personal

TR at 52.

knowledge

of

where

the

Further, Plaintiff did not

know whether or not the Navajo Court authorized the repossession.
TR at 52.

The trial court specifically noted this lack of

evidence in ruling in the case.
the Plaintiff
whatsoever

in

had

Id at 73-74.

It is clear that

no involvement, knowledge or participation

the

retrieval

of

uncontested in the factual record.

the

automobile.

TR at 6-8.

That

is

Furthermore there

is no evidence as to whether Defendant's brother-in-law consented
to the repossession.

But Defendant does say that "he [brother-

in-law] let them take it."

TR at 46.

The vehicle was delivered in rough condition by Chrysler
Credit to Plaintiff.

TR at 9-10, 55-56.

Plaintiff repaired and

4
cleaned the vehicle.

Id at 14.

the car lot for sale.
prospective purchasers.

Then the vehicle was placed on

The vehicle was advertised and shown to
Id at 13-14, 19/ 34-38.

Since there was

little interest in the vehicle, it was then offered to other
dealers and bids were obtained.

Id at 13, 17.

Plaintiff attempted to notify the Defendant that the vehicle
would be sold and a deficiency could result.

TR at 20.

Exhibit

#9 was sent to Box 141 in Brimhall addressed to Louise Curley,
certified mail, return receipt requested.
of

Defendant's

made.

brother-in-law

Id at 47-49.

from which payments were being

Defendant knew and assumed that was the

address being used, for correspondence
know".

This was the address

"I assumed that... you

Id at 48.

Plaintiff in good faith sent the notice to that address.
The return receipt came back with
having received Exhibit #9.

"Louise Curley" signed

See Exhibit #9, green slip.

as
The

Defendant testified she didn't see the letter and didn't sign the
green slip.
name.

JEd.

TR at 49.

She thought her brother-in-law wrote her

Plaintiff learned of this situation at the trial; it

had no way of knowing that Defendant had not received Exhibit #9.
The court specifically found, after reviewing the entire
situation, evidence that the

"notice given for the sale was

reasonable under the circumstances".

TR at 73.

the sale was commercially reasonable."

jrd.

Further "that

Lastly, "that no

greater value could have been obtained by any other method".

Id.

5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Point I.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE SHOWING PLAINTIFF'S VIOLATION
OF NAVAJO TRIBAL LAW.

(1)

The record is completely silent whether Defendant or

her brother-in-law are Navajo Indians.

(2) There is no credible

evidence where the car was located when repossessed.

(3)

There

is no evidence as to whether or not a Navajo Nation court order
was obtained.

(4)

Plaintiff had no involvement or connection

with the repossession.

Point II.

PLAINTIFF'S REPOSSESSION SALE WAS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE COMMERCIAL CODE.

The trial

court's

factual

finding of

"reasonable notice

under the circumstance" followed by a "commercially reasonable"
sale and that " no greater value could be obtained by any other
method"

are

supported

in the record.

They are not clearly

erroneous.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THERE

IS NO

EVIDENCE

SHOWING

PLAINTIFF'S

VIOLATION

NAVAJO TRIBAL LAW.

The law quoted by the Defendant on appeal starts with these

6

words,

"The personal property of Navajo Indians shall".

The

statute is clearly restricted to personal property of Navajo
Indians.

There

is no evidence anywhere in the record that

Defendant is a Navajo Indian.

There is no evidence that her

brother-in-law is a Navajo Indian.
The Navajo law quoted by Defendant restricts repossession
activities in the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.
There is no credible evidence where this vehicle was repossessed.
There is no evidence whether or not an order was obtained
from the Ncivajo Court.
does not know.

Plaintiff was not involved so it simply

There is no evidence as to whether Defendant's

brother-in-law, the evident purchaser, gave written consent to
repossess.

Or alternatively, whether the car was within the

"territorial jurisdiction" when repossessed.
not involved so it does not know.

Plaintiff again was

The lack of any discovery

efforts by Defendant leaves the record without development on
these issues.
answers.

Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant presented the

The record is simply blank.

Another question arises.

Even if a car were proven to be on

the reservation does that mean it is within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.
is not available.

The answer to that question

No court can assume or take judicial notice of

the statutes which answer this question.

The trial court was

never givem any basis on which to determine this question.
201, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Rule

Judge Perry, the trial judge, had

no way of knowing the answer and neither does this Court of

7
Appeals.

There is proof needed and it is wholly lacking.

Hunt

v. Monroe, 32 Utah 424, 91 P 269 (1907); Home Brewing Co. v.
American Chem Ozokerrte Co., 58 Utah 219, 198 P 170 (192U: Maple
v. Maple, 566 P2d 1229 (Utah 1977).

See, e.g.,

Whitmore Oxygen

Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission., 114 Utah 1, 196 P2d 976
(1948).
More obvious is the fact that this Plaintiff had absolutely
nothing to do with the retrieval of car from whom and from where
it was.

Plaintiff's duty to repurchase the car arises only

when

Chrysler Credit delivers it to Plaintiff's property in Logan.
There is no legal basis whatsoever to suggest Plaintiff violated
any law even if Chrysler Credit did.
never been involved

in this case.

That party is not and has
Furthermore there is no

evidence of any agency relationship with the Plaintiff.

POINT II.
PLAINTIFF'S REPOSSESSION SALE WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE COMMERCIAL CODE.

The

trial

procedures.

court

carefully

It specifically

examined

found

Plaintiff's

them to be

sale

"commercially

reasonable" and that "a higher price could not be obtained with
any other method."

T.R. at 73.

Defendant suggests that the Court of Appeals should remove
the trial court from factual evaluation and determination in
these

cases.

Defendant

wants

an

arbitrary

legal

standard.

8
Defendant

suggests

that

trial

courts

are

not

capable

evaluating circumstances and determining "reasonableness".

of
The

Defendant is suggesting that some standard other than "clearly
erroneous" be used in evaluating these factual determinations.
Defendant suggests this was a "private sale".

In fact, the

vehicle was offered and advertised publicly for some time.

Only

when there were no inquiries or interest did Plaintiff show it to
other dealers.

After getting their fair evaluation of market

value, Plaintiff did sell it to Davis Chrysler Dodge for the
highest bid.

The Defendant wholly failed to prove the price was

inadequate or suggest any different way to have sold the vehicle.
There is clearly a recognized market for used cars and
widely

distributed

standard

price

quotations.

Courts

have

disagreed with whether used cars can be sold to the secured party
in a private sale.

Utah has no decision on this issue.

event, this was not a private sale.

In any

Plaintiff did everything

possible to sell the vehicle by advertising and showing it on its
used car lot.

Only when this failed did it get bids.

That does

not make it a private sale.
It is true that Defendant evidently did not get the notice,
Exhibit #9.

Defendant is not blameless in this regard.

When she

learned of the repossession she made no effort to contact anyone.
Clearly her brother-in-law breached his contract with her.

His

apparent forgery of her name on the return receipt shows his
disregard

for her position.

Plaintiff

reasonably rely on such a signature.

can be expected to

Plaintiff has no way to

9
avoid

being

tricked

by

such a

signature.

It appears that

Plaintiff made reasonable effort to notify the Defendant.

CONCLUSION

There
reversal

is
of

simply
the

no

trial

basis

in

court's

this record
decision.

justifying a
"Commercial

reasonableness" as adjudged by the experienced trial judge falls
within the legal parameters defined in Utah decisions.

The

important and novel issue in this case involves the juxtaposition
of Navajo tribal law.

On this count, Defendant has failed to

develop the necessary evidentiary basis or to prove Plaintiff's
complicity in such a violation.
A circuit court in Logan, Utah can hardly be expected to
enforce Navajo tribal law (which it learns nothing of) against a
Plaintiff who never went near the New Mexico Navajo Reservation.
In this case there is no evidence that Defendant is a Navajo.
There is no credible evidence where the truck was located.

There

is no evidence as to the relationship between reservation and
territorial jurisdiction.
did

get

an

order.

Perhaps Chrysler Credit a non-party

Perhaps brother-in-law did give written

consent.

Defendant has simply failed to erect the factual basis

on which

this

court might reach the legal issues raised in

Defendant's Brief.
Plaintiff

requests that the Court of Appeals affirm the

decision, awarding costs and attorneys fees on appeal to the

10
Plaintiff.

DATED

this

/

day of October, 1988.

DAINES & KANE

N. George Daines
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
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